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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION" LAW REFORM AND THE RECONSTRUCTIVE
PARADOX
RICHARD DELGADO*
JEAN STEFANCIC**
INTRODUCTION
Broadly speaking, there are two views about Brown v. Board
of Educatin.1 The conventional view holds that Brown is one of
the two or three most important cases in American legal history
According to this interpretation, Brown supplied the impetus for
the modem civil rights movement, demonstrated that courts, at
least at times, can assert moral leadership, and emphasized that
African Americans are entitled to live in the United States on
terms equal to whites.2
The other view, that of the revisionists, holds that Brown v.
Board of Educatin accomplished relatively little, either in the
short or long run.? Revisionists argue that Brown is the product
of a momentary convergence between white and black interests
that began to fade soon thereafter.4 Some argue that landmark
cases like Brown may even impair the cause of black rights by
inducing a mood of unwarranted euphoria among supporters
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., Boalt
Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1974.
** Research Associate, Umversity of Colorado School of Law. M.A., University of
San Francisco, 1989.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Books in this general vem include RIcHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976);
and JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE (1987). For a discussion of the conventional
view and its alleged weaknesses, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown; Ractal Change
and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
3. On the revisionist view of Brown, see, for example, KIarman, supra note 2; on
the revisionist view of law reform generally, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOL-
LOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); see also Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
4. E.g., Bell, supra note 3.
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while stiffening resistance on the part of diehards and white
supremacists.' Revisionists and conventionalists are apt to dif-
fer not only in their understanding of Brown, but in their inter-
pretation of how social change occurs. In general, revisionists
hold that social reform is difficult to achieve, especially through
law, and that gains have a way of slipping back.' The more san-
guine conventionalists argue that if Brown has not brought
about racial justice by itself, we can at least move closer to this
goal through further effort. Brown has certainly helped; and if it
has fallen short, what we need is a Brown III or a Brown IV7
Although these and other differences separate the revisionists
and the conventionalists, in one respect they both approach
Brown in the same manner. Each examines the situation that
prevailed before and after Brown and asks: Did the landmark
decision make a difference? Were the forces that led to the
1960s-era reforms already in motion before Brown? Did Brown
benefit white elites more than it benefited blacks? If it benefited
blacks, did it help mostly middle-class blacks, leaving the
underclass as badly off as before? Both groups, in short, examine
Brown longitudinally and temporally, looking for evidence of
causation or its lack. The argument has what we might call a
vertical character: One lines up the situation that prevailed
before Brown, and that after, and looks for signs that Brown
brought about changes.
In this Essay, we argue that an ignored, and equally vital,
axis is horizontal.' To understand Brown's role, and that of law
reform cases generally, one must attend to contemporaneous
events in society at the time Brown was decided. Focusing on
this other dimension enables us to understand why Brown v.
Board of Education was seen as a breakthrough case, even
though it failed to have much effect outside the narrow area of
5. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 3, 111 (1987); Klarman, supra note 2, at 85 (discussing the way Brown in-
spired a wave of southern resistance).
6. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 5; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED
REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2.
8. That is to say, an axis that examines events contemporaneous with a key
event, rather than ones that came earlier or later.
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school desegregation.9 It enables us to understand why even in
that area, Brown had less effect than one might have hoped.1 °
Moreover, focusing on this horizontal dimension allows us to
understand law's limitations in propelling social change in gen-
eral.
We begin by summarizing what Brown was and was not able
to accomplish, doctrinally and conceptually, employing as our
principal illustration the debate over campus hate speech
rules." We argue that society's resistance to reform in this area
is just one example of a backward drift in matters of race, and
the decisions whose narratives more aptly characterize our time
are not Brown but the mneteenth century Supreme Court cas-
es-Plessy v. Ferguson,2 the Civil Rights Cases,13 and Dred
Scott v. Sandford.4 Finally, we put forward a reconstructwe
paradox that names and explains why, despite evidence to the
contrary, we continue to believe the legal system can bring
about significant change in areas such as race when it is in fact
capable of bringing about very little. 5
I. HOW BROWN FAILED TO GENERALIZE
Many critics have pointed out that Brown accomplished rela-
tively little in the way of school desegregation, except in the
Deep South, and that black children are as likely today as they
were forty years ago to attend predominantly black schools.'
9. See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 30-44 hnd accompanying text. For writing on the issue of hate
speech, see, for example, MARI MATEUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WoUND (1993); Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DuKE L.J.
484.
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
15. For an earlier treatment of a related mechanism, the empathic fallacy, see
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Kiarman, supra note 2, at 11-12, 76-86; see also ANDREW HACKER,
TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); THE WORDS
OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (Coretta S. King ed., 1987) [hereinafter MLK]; Jerome
M. Culp, Jr., Water Buffalo and Diversity: Naming Names and Reclaiming the Racial
1995] 549
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To this, one could add doctrinal retrenchment in closely related
areas. Although subsequent courts have left Brown standing, in
the sense that they did not expressly overrule it, they have done
much to cut back its effect. School districts may not enact metro-
politan desegregation plans, at least in the absence of a showing
of prior discrimination." Education is not a fundamental inter-
est," nor poverty a suspect class.' 9 States have no obligation
to fund property-rich and property-poor districts sunilarly20
Segregation that results from white flight is essentially irreme-
diable.2" Black male academies are unconstitutional,22 nunon-
ty scholarships under fire,23 and affirmative action that takes
the form of reserving slots in state-funded professional schools is
illegal.24
Why did Brown end up having so little effect, even in the area
of school reform? Elsewhere, we have put forward the thesis that
social reform through law is relatively ineffective because law's
scope is so narrow 25 Because every social practice is part of an
interlocking system of other practices, meanings, and interpreta-
tions, changing just one element (for example, school assignment
rules) leaves the rest unchanged.26 Thus, when the Supreme
Discourse, 26 CONN. L. REV. 209, 24647 (1993) (discussing the situation in law
schools).
17. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
18. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
20. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1; see also Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (upholding state consti-
tutional provision requiring low-rent housing projects to be approved by a majority of
qualified electors).
21. Metropolitan desegregation plans are permissible only if the segregation results
from official action, not the aggregate of individual decisions by white families to
move to the suburbs. See Milliken, 433 U.S. 267.
22. On the difficulties of establishing such schools with public funds, see Jacque-
line Conciatore, Detroit Must Admit Girls to Public All-Male Academies, Judge Says,
BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 29, 1991, at 8; Whites in Detroit Teach Stu-
dents at Black School a Fourth R: Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at B6.
23. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, Federal Law and Scholarship Policy: An Essay on
the Office for Civil Rights, Title VI and Racial Restrictions, 18 J.C. & U.L. 21 (1991)
(articulating the position of the recent Republican administration on this issue).
24. Regents of the Umv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 6; see also MLK, supra note 16.
26. E.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 6; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
15.
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Court decided Brown, its principle was soon robbed of much
effect when, in a myriad of decisions, school officials, lower
courts, sheriffs, and others interpreted Brown against the famil-
iar background.27 "Of course, the Supreme Court didn't mean
that," they would reason in close cases. It is as though legal
decisions take place against a gravitational field, with the pull
being toward the familiar, toward stasis.' Because Brown set
out to change just one element, leaving the force-field itself
intact, its effect quickly eroded. For social reform to happen,
"everything must change at once," but in the law, doctrines such
as stare decisis, standing, mootness, ripeness, and political ques-
tion mean that the law cannot change everything at once.29 It
can only decide the case before it.
Disbelieving or obstructionist officials are not the only forces
that act to rob landmark decisions of much of their effect. If that
were true, all that would be necessary would be vigilance and
determined enforcement. Rather, such decisions fail to establish
themselves in the wider legal culture, so that even those who
are generally sympathetic to reform fail to see their applications
in closely related areas.
Consider, for example, the debate over campus hate-speech
rules.3 0 Beginning about a decade ago, college and umversity
administrators began noticing an upsurge in the number of
racist insults, graffiti, and namecalling taking place on their
campuses.3' At some institutions, the number of students of
color began to drop as parents decided to send their sons and
daughters elsewhere." Many campuses responded by enacting
27. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
28. See BELL, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the way racial breakthroughs erode
soon thereafter); see also Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial
Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (elaborating on this pro-
cess); MLK, supra note 16, at 118-19 (on resistance to civil rights decrees).
29. On these doctrines and the way they limit the range of cases and issues
courts may consider, see RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1026-
73 (3d ed. 1989).
30. On the problem of hate speech m general, see sources cited supra note 11; on
campus hate speech, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiractsm Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991).
31. Id. at 348-58.
32. Id. at 376, 386 n.354.
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anti-hate-speech rules that punished certain forms of racial or
sexual taunting or namecalling.33 The rules sparked immediate
resistance.
Brown at least had some effect. Today, a school official who
might be tempted to assign all the black children to one school
and the white ones to another, would likely think, "I had better
not do that, at least unless I disguise what I am doing." Today's
opponents of hate-speech rules, however, show little such hesita-
tion; they proceed as though Brown had not taken place at
all.14 Hate-speech rules are in many respects like student-as-
signment rules.35 Yet, opponents make the same arguments
against them, the same rhetorical moves, that we witnessed
with the classic resistance to school desegregation.
Under Plessy v. Ferguson,36 schemes that allocated benefits
along racial lines were upheld, so long as the benefit blacks
received was roughly comparable to that received by whites. In
Plessy, blacks were forced to ride in one railroad car, whites in
another.37 The Supreme Court upheld the railroad's rule: sep-
arate but equal. Whites and blacks were equally disadvantaged:
neither could ride in the other's car. A similar situation pre-
vailed in the schools of Topeka, Kansas, at the time Brown was
decided. Indeed, shortly after the decision was announced, a
famous constitutional scholar was prompted to wonder if the
decision was principled: Why should the rights of blacks to asso-
ciate with whites trump that of whites not to associate with
blacks?38 One right balanced another, one claim against its
perfect reciprocal.
In the debate about hate-speech, we find a strikingly similar
33. For a discussion of some campuses where rules have been enacted, see id. at
358-61.
34. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of these parallels, see Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Overcoming Legal Barriers to Regulating Hate Speech on
Campuses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 11, 1993, at B1; infra notes 38-44 and ac-
companying text.
36. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
37. Id. at 537-39.
38. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
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structure. The white insists on a right to say whatever is on his
mind. The black demands protection when what is on the
white's mind is a direct face-to-face racial insult. One claims a
right to do X, the other the right not to have X done to him. One
right emanates from one part of the Constitution-the First
Amendment-one, from another-the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 9 As with separate but equal, today's debate over hate
speech features commentators insisting that the black's injury is
all in his head.0 This perspective parallels early cases in which
the Supreme Court told Negroes that the indignity of being
herded into separate railroad cars is offensive only if they put
that construction on it. 4 Today's opponents of hate-speech rules
dismiss the black's injury as merely dignitary, and not a real
harm.2 One well-regarded constitutional scholar recently re-
jected the "silencing" argument by pointing out that it requires
mental mediation-the victim decides to remain silent.43 As
with Brown, the opposition to hate-speech rules portrays itself
as highly principled. It is not in favor of hate-speech (heaven for-
bid). Rather, there are other, higher prnciples at stake here.'
II. WHY BROWN FAILED TO GENERALIZE
Brown effected little change in terms of doctrine, conscious-
ness, or the realities of life for black schoolchildren. Yet, society
has constructed the decision as a breakthrough of momentous
proportions. We believe the two observations are related.
Brown's sharp departure from the past caused it to stand out, to
seem a breathtaking advance. This departure also assured that
39. For a discussion of these and other similarities, see Delgado, supra note 30, at
345-48; Lawrence, supra note 35, at 438-40.
40. See DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDtJCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX
ON CAMPUS 132-36, 156 (1991); NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME BUT NOT FOR
THEE (1992) (stating that minorities are ready to complain of imagined or exaggerat-
ed slights).
41. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
42. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 11, at 498 (characterizing the injury to minori-
ties as merely suffering an unpleasant environment).
43. Cass R. Sunstem, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1993).
44. Strossen, supra note 11 (observing that debate implicates our grand national
commitment to free speech, academic freedom, the true interests of minorities, and
other high-sounding values).
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it would fail to "take"--would succumb to what we called earlier
a kind of social gravity 45 In this Part, we spell out in greater
detail what that gravity is. We conclude by describing a "recon-
structive paradox" that affects all reform movements, especially
those that rely heavily on law and litigation.
A. The Forces That Swallow Social Reform Decisions Like
Brown
What we have described as a kind of social gravity that affects
all novel social claims, especially legal ones, has at least three
components. As we previously mentioned, it includes the system
of meamngs and interpretations against which the new rule
must operate.46 It also includes a set of narratives, or "stock
stones," with which the new ruling is required to harmomze.47
Lastly, it includes a set of social practices with which the new
command must contend. 48 Each of these components mitigates
the new decision's effect. Each is an aspect of what we called the
horizontal dimension49 of a case, that which was taking place in
society at the time the case was adjudicated.
1. Meanings and Social Interpretations.
Any text, including legal ones, is interpreted against a back-
ground of meamngs, presumptions, and preexisting understand-
ings.0 If a parent tells a child, "Clean up your room," the terms
"clean" and "room" have relatively well agreed-upon meamngs:
The child knows he or she is not expected to launder the drapes
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
47. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 15; Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing the role of narratives and stock stores in con-
structing social reality and guiding what we do and do not see).
48. See, e.g., Girardeau Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990) (dis-
cussing the role of social practices in confining the effect of legal decrees).
49. For an explanation of our use of this term, see supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text.
50. These background elements often reflect the operation of social power and
tradition. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on
Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813 (1992).
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or vacuum the attic space above the room. If an adolescent tells
the parent, 'Tll be back by midmght," both understand that
"midnight" means tonight, not next week, and that "back" means
inside the house. The same is true of legal commands. Thus,
when Brown ordered school districts to desegregate "with all
deliberate speed,"5 southern officials interpreted the decree in
terms of their common sense. In hundreds of close cases, they
construed Brown to mean the only thing it could mean, consis-
tent with their experience: integration that went not too far, not
too fast, and that left the school system as intact as possible.
52
Operators of public beaches, restaurants, colleges, and other
facilities interpreted Brown as a case affecting only schools.
Some school officials even took the position that it bound only
the districts before the court." To recalcitrant officials, Brown
looked like an exception, an improbable edict that should natu-
rally be interpreted in that light. The only way to harmonize it
with common sense was to construe it narrowly- "Of course, the
Supreme Court did not mean that blacks and whites are strictly
equal," they told themselves. "They surely didn't mean that we
would have to do this" (assign black principals to white schools;
provide college counseling to all; adopt due process protections in
school discipline cases affecting black children facing expulsion,
and so on). Because Brown was interpreted against the back-
ground of a myriad of such understandings, traditions, and ex-
pectations, and because, unlike a parent, the Supreme Court
was not instantly available to clarify what it meant, the case
had relatively little impact. It did change one thing, pupil as-
signment rules, but the rest of society remained essentially the
same.54 The gain in this one area was quickly swallowed up by
interpretive effects emanating from all the others.55
51. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown I1).
52. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 552-54,
565-607 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the process of interpretation); Kiarman, supra note
2, at 12, 76-85.
53. BELL, supra note 52, at 118-20, 565-607.
54. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text; infra notes 78-81, 84-92 and ac-
companying text.
55. BELL, supra note 52; see also sources cited supra note 3 (discussing revisiomst
interpretations of Brown).
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2. Social Practices.
A second component of what we have called the gravitational
field against which new legal rules must operate is the set of
preexisting social practices, most of which the Supreme Court is
powerless to change. These include friendship patterns, the way
a teacher looks at or responds to a black child, and that child's
own self-concept and expectations with respect to treatment
from whites. These practices include the ways in which librar-
ans, bus drivers, shop owners, and landlords deal with the
young black schoolchild and his or her family They include who
is chosen for student body president, the debate team, and the
cheerleading squad. If all of these practices remain the same
while only school assignment rules change, a black child's life
will not be greatly improved after Brown (and may be consider-
ably worse).56
Of course, a forced change in one social practice theoretically
could prompt reconsideration of all the others. Because white
schoolchildren now are required to attend school in a building
that will house some blacks, the other social practices we have
mentioned might begin to change. But everything we know
about cognitive dissonance and resistance to the unfamiliar
suggests the opposite.57 New practices that are discordant with
old ones are resisted and adopted, if at all, slowly and grudging-
ly 58 New reasons are found to justify now disputed social prac-
tices.59
3. The Role of Narratwes.
A final component of the social milieu that affects the recep-
tion of a legal decision or rule is the backdrop of narratives or
stones against which the new element will be forced to oper-
ate.60 Narratives are the simple, script-like interpretive struc-
56. See MLK, supra note 16, at 6 (observing that the costs of racial remedies
generally are exacted from blacks); Spann, supra note 48.
57. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 15 (discussing the role of narratives
in shaping how we see the world); Delgado, supra note 30.
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tures--- he hit first," "I didn't know it was yours," "majority
rules," or "I've been here longer"-that we use in ordering our
understanding of the world."'
In the school desegregation setting, court decrees confront a
whole host of narratives and social perceptions that generate
resistance. Such narratives include: "Neighborhood schools are
best"; "who are these outsiders trying to tell us what to do?";
"our Negroes were happy until "; "black people just want to
push into where they are not wanted"; "they want things they
don't deserve and haven't earned"; "integration might be okay,
but the schools should remain predominantly white, and the
curriculum, teachers, and so on, roughly as they are now"; etc. 2
As with meanings and social practices, these and other narra-
tives could theoretically change. A person who holds a stock of
hundreds of such narratives regarding minority people, neigh-
borhood schools, and "the way things are" could radically revise
his or her worldview when confronted by the image of a surpns-
ingly nice, intelligent, reasonable black individual at a school or
work place. But narratives change very slowly, in part because
we interpret new experiences and new narratives in terms of the
old ones-the ones we hold. 3 These old narratives, indeed,
form the basis for understanding new experiences, including
that of our first close black associate. It is far easier to pro-
nounce the black an "exception" than to revise one's entire stock
of beliefs.
Eventually, of course, social stones and practices change. But
they do much more slowly than we like to think.' And when
they do, courts and decrees play little role in bnnging about the
change. 5 Courts are usually distant institutions. Unlike flesh-
and-blood persons, they cannot follow up an exchange by saying,
for example: "No, he is not an exception; most of them are like
that if you take the trouble to get to know them." Courts are not
61. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 15.
62. See Kiarman, supra note 2 (discussing this resistance).
63. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 15, at 1259-60 (definmg "empathic fallacy"
as the belief that we can change our own, and each other's, belief systems quickly
and easily by presenting new arguments, stones, or accounts).
64. Id.
65. See ROSENBERG, supra note 3; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 6.
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in a position to engage society in the kund of continuing dialogue
that could in theory change meanings and practices.66 They can
only change one practice at a time. Everything else-the entire
system of practices, traditions, and meamngs-remamns the
same, exerting its gravitational tug toward the familiar. In giv-
ing obedience to the new decree-something the courts are in a
position to enforce-hundreds of lower-level bureaucrats, state
officials, and lower court judges will interpret the ringing words
according to their common sense understandings about persons,
about relations, and about what is just and deserved. 7
B. The Reconstructwe Paradox
The combined effect of the forces just mentioned means that
any reform measure other than the smallest and most incremen-
tal will meet predictable resistance, reinterpretation, and ob-
struction in ways that the legal system is ill equipped to manage
and counter. 68 One perspective from which to view these hori-
zontal forces is in terms of what we call the "reconstructive
paradox." After defimng the paradox," we illustrate its opera-
tion by demonstrating that the current approach to race and
race remedies shows the influence of the mneteenth-century
cases, especially Plessy v. Ferguson, more than that of their
more famous twentieth-century rival, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.7°
1. Defining the Reconstructwe Paradox
Much of what we have said so far can be summarized in the
following six steps, constituting what we call the reconstructive
66. Communities (large collectivities) by contrast, are essential to the process of
forming and sharing meanings. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); see also FISH, supra note 50, at 278-81
(illustrating one court's limited ability to communicate the meaning of statutory
language). Federal judges are situated too distantly and remotely to effect rapid
change in social meanings.
67. See supra notes 27-29, 50-53 and accompanying text.
68. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 15, at 1258-59 (observing that speech and
dialogue can effectively correct small, clearly bounded, but not systemic, error).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 78-130.
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paradox:
(1) The greater a social evil (for example black subordination)
the more it is apt to be entrenched in our national life.71
(2) The more entrenched the evil, the more massive the social
effort that will be necessary to eradicate it.
72
(3) The harm of an entrenched evil will be invisible to many
because it is embedded and ordinary 7
(4) The massive social effort will inevitably collide with other
social values and things we hold dear (for example, settled ex-
pectations, religion, the family, privacy, the southern way of life,
etc.). It will entail dislocations, shifts in spending priorities, new
taxes, and changes in the way we speak and relate to each oth-
er.
74
(5) These efforts, by contrast, will be highly visible and will
spark resistance and accusations that the backers are engaging
in totalitarian tactics, siding with big government, dislodging
innocent whites, operating in derogation of the merit principle,
elevating group over individual relief, reviving old grudges,
whipping up division where none existed before, and so on.75
(6) Resisting these latter complaints will feel right and proper,
for the other side will appear to be callously sacrificing real
liberty, real security, and real resources for a nebulous goal.76
Therefore, reconstruction will always strike many in a society
as unprincipled, unwarranted, and wrong. Little surprise, then,
that few take up its cause, persist for long in the face of the
resistance it calls forth, or even frame their programs and objec-
71. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 50; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 15.
72. Racism, for example, is generally agreed to consist of a complex of attitudes
and practices that permeate institutions and individuals. See, e.g., THE SOCIOLOGY
OF RACE RELATIONS: REFLECTION AND REFORM (Thomas F Pettigrew ed., 1980);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (reconsidering the doctrine of discrim-
inatory purpose).
73. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) (suggesting
that racial equality is unobtainable because of the entrenched racism of Americans).
74. Id., see also BELL, supra note 5 (doubting that society will ever undertake
such an effort).
75. Bell, supra note 73; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357
(1992).
76. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025
(1994).
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tives broadly enough so that if they are adopted, they have a
chance of remaining in place and achieving some real effects.
2. Back to Plessy" Present-Day Rhetoric and Evidence of the
Reconstructwe Paradox Operating in Our Time
Reform through law alone, as we mentioned, is apt to have
little effect, because legal decrees succumb silently and painless-
ly to interpretation and other forms of cultural weight.77 Even
when, as happened with the civil rights revolution of the 1960s,
legal reform operates in concert with broader social forces to
produce undemable and much-needed gains, resistance is apt to
set in at some point. Consider how today we no longer talk m
terms of separateness as an inherent injury, of black schoolchil-
dren as victims, or of racism as a harm whose injury "is unlikely
ever to be undone." Instead, we speak of the need for formal
neutrality, of the dangers affirmative action poses for innocent
whites, and of the need for black Americans to look to their own
resources.7 Moderates and conservatives alike have rolled back
affirmative action79 and challenged university and college
theme houses, special curricula, and ethnic studies depart-
ments," which they see as violations of the merit principle and
fair and equal treatment policies. Courts are quick to strike
down set-aside programs and affirmative action plans as "quota
systems" likely to discriminate against "innocent whites."8" The
narrative of Plessy v. Ferguson" more aptly characterizes our
77. See supra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
78. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 76 (collecting and evaluating examples of
judicial and social rhetoric regarding blacks and other minorities); Thomas Ross,
Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990).
79. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding
that admissions program which reserved positions in medical school class for disad-
vantaged minority students was unconstitutional). For a discussion of this retrench-
ment, see JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLI-
TICS OF INEQUALITY (1979).
80. See, e.g., D'SOUZA, supra note 40 (discussing the academic and cultural revolu-
tion at American umversities).
81. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking
down plan requiring city construction contracts to subcontract 30% of each contract
to minority-owned businesses); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 381 (1989).
82. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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attitudes with respect to race than do the stnrmg words of Brown.
In Plessy, United States Supreme Court Justice Brown could
not see anything wrong with a system that required blacks to sit
in separate railroad cars, overlooking the unmistakable damage
inflicted on blacks' sense of dignity by such a discriminatory
system. Indeed, he wrote:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument
to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of
the tvo races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferi-
ority If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it.8
In a recent case, City of Memphis v. Greene,' Justice Stevens
declared that a muicipal decision to separate a white neighbor-
hood from a black one by allowing the construction of a wall
between them to regulate traffic flow was fair and not motivated
by an intention to discriminate against blacks, but rather by an
"interest in protecting the safety and tranquillity of a residential
neighborhood." 5 Echoing the earlier opimon of Justice Brown
in Plessy, Stevens wrote:
Because urban neighborhoods are so frequently characterized
by a common ethmc or racial heritage, a regulation's adverse
impact on a particular neighborhood will often have a dis-
parate effect on an identifiable ethic or racial group. To
regard an inevitable consequence of that kind as a form of
stigma so severe as to violate the Thirteenth Amendment
would trivialize the great purpose of that charter of free-
dom.86
In both cases, separated by nearly a century, during which much
progress in race relations was said to have been made, blacks
have been presented with a rhetorical legerdemain that tests
both their ability to participate in societal self-deception and
their inclination to prevail in the face of it.
83. Id. at 551.
84. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
85. Id. at 119-20.
86. Id. at 128.
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Other modern-era cases show the same tendency to disregard
blacks' long-standing predicament or whites' contribution to it.
Because Brown only addressed the effects of segregated educa-
tion on black schoolchildren, remaimng silent on the issue of
white responsibility, it was perhaps inevitable that the question
of fault would become the next hurdle to blacks struggling to
achieve social gains. Washington v. Daws 7 is perhaps the most
well-known example, but there have been a number of others. In
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,'
the Court held that certain zoning regulations that had the
effect of excluding blacks were constitutionally valid because
they were not enacted with that purpose in mind. 9 In San An-
tonio Independent School Dzstrict v. Rodriguez," a school fi-
nance scheme that caused a great disparity in funding tax-rich
and tax-poor schools was upheld despite its serious impact on
poor and minority children."' And, as mentioned earlier, a traf-
fic control measure that took the form of a wall between white
and black neighbors in Memphis was deemed just that, a traffic
control measure, despite the way in which it physically and
symbolically separated the races.92
Each of these cases foreshadows a retreat from the ringing
words of Brown; each in many ways is reminiscent of the
crabbed neutrality and unrealistic refusal to see discrmination
that characterized Plessy Not only has our time implicitly resur-
rected Plessy in its approach to racial justice, but a second noto-
rous mneteenth century case's star is rising: the Civil Rights
Cases."' In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court wrote
that blacks who were demanding equal access to various types of
public accommodation were seriously overstepping and in effect
demanding to be afforded special treatment. The Court wrote:
87. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a test administered to black applicants for
employment as police officers was not unconstitutional because the purpose was not
discriminatory even though the impact may have been).
88. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
89. Id. at 268-70.
90. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
91. Id. at 54-55.
92. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing City of Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)).
93. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protect-
ed.'
Cases in our time show much the same attitude. Blacks' de-
mands for justice are themselves unjust, because they are a form
of asking for special treatment and because they encroach on
white privilege and settled expectations. One example is Regents
of the Unwerszty of California v. Bakke.9" There, the Supreme
Court upheld the challenge of a white applicant to a state-spon-
sored medical school.9" The plurality opinion cast him in the
role of victim. The medical school's affirmative action program,
which reserved a small number of slots for African Americans,
unconstitutionally violated the rights of applicants such as
Bakke.97 The University's program operated unfairly against
"innocent persons in respondent's position."98 The state's inter-
est in remedying past discrimination was not sufficiently com-
pelling to justify the "special treatment" black candidates re-
ceived. In language reimmscent of Justice Bradley's in the Civil
Rights Cases, the plurality opinion painted the university's affir-
mative action program to increase the number of black doctors
as coddling and favoritism.99 Other recent affirmative action
cases have taken a similar position and employed rhetoric near-
ly as unsympathetic as that of Bakke.' °
The most startling parallel is found in City of Richmond v.
94. Id. at 24-25.
95. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 320.
98. Id. at 298 (plurality opimon of Powell, J.).
99. Id. at 295, 298-99.
100. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (rejecting
role-model argument for affirmative action as dangerous, unproven, and potentially
unbounded).
1995] 563
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
J.A. Croson Co., 1 where the Court struck down a minority
set-aside program in the construction industry that had been
adopted by the Richmond city council. 2 The majority opinion
found the council's action a potential case of "simple racial
politics." °3 A concurring opinion went even further, warning
that society should be watchful against those who might attempt
to "even the score" at the expense of whites. 0 4
Societal rhetoric follows suit. A host of commentators today
rail against multicultural programs on university campuses;0 5
minority-only scholarships are under fire;" 6 welfare programs
are under sustained attack as disguised give-aways to undeserv-
ing, unambitious, and oversexed blacks; and the use of code-
words, like "political correctness" indicates that many in our
society believe that blacks have gone too far.' They are now
receiving special, not just equal treatment. It is time to put a
stop to it, just as it is time to begin closing our borders to imim-
gration from Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and other societies of col-
or. 10
8
We believe, then, that dispassionate examination of today's
dominant narratives shows that the themes of Plessy and the
Civil Rights Cases are in ascension. We put forward an even
more somber prediction: Unless there is concerted action or a
sharp change in national circumstances, one final step will be
taken. Just as the clock of time seems to be rolling backward, a
final narrative may soon regain prominence: that of Dred Scott
v. Sandford.0 9
101. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 493.
104. Id. at 527-28 (Scalia J., concurring).
105. E.g., D'SOuZA, supra note 40.
106. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
107. For examples of various social texts, ranging from editorials to conservative
treatises, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 76.
108. Id. at 1032 (discussing immigration issues); Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred
Scott, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987) (reviewing PETER SHUCK & ROGER SMITH,
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT* ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)).
109. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). For other discussions of the rhetorical parallels between
Dred Scott, other nineteenth century cases, and today's cases, see Ross, supra note
78; Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Ab-
straction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990).
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In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court, in a case concerning a
runaway slave, held that African Americans have "no rights
which the white person is bound to respect.""' The claim of an
African American to citizenship was absurd, both historically
and legally- Blacks simply were not citizens because they never
were such and the framers of the Constitution, "great men,"
never regarded them that way ". Dred Scott constitutes, cer-
tainly, the nadir of American law's treatment of African Amen-
cans, a blot on the record of the American legal conscience. Yet,
its narrative retains vitality today We see growing evidence of it
in Supreme Court opinions and in popular culture."'
Justice Taney's opinion depicted blacks as subhumans."' Is
this shocking portrayal of other beings so far from today's range
of possibilities? Is the story of the primitive bestial black or
Mexican completely missing in today's narratives, both in popu-
lar culture and in judicial opinions? Unfortunately, we believe
not. Indeed, we believe this account of groups of color is under-
going a resurgence.
Consider, for example, the revival of race-IQ theories, some
seconded by well-regarded scientists and writers such as Charles
Murray, Richard Herrnstem,"4 Arthur Jensen". and William
Shockley16 Consider the number of books, such as Ben
Wattenberg's The Birth Dearth,"7 and reports that have urged
renewed attention to the question of selective breeding: Our
"best" citizens have too few children; minorities and the poor, too
many, so that the gene pool in the United States is declining.
Consider the resurgence of nativism and movements to close the
110. Id. at 404-07.
111. Id. at 410.
112. See &nfra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
113. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405-10 (depwting history of blacks as chattels).
114. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, IQ IN THE MERITOCRACY (1973); RICHARD HERRNSTEIN
& CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994).
115. Arthur Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement? 39
HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1969).
116. For a discussion of the Nobel prize-winning scientiss controversial views on
race and IQ, see Richard Delgado et al., Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional
Validity of Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128
(1983).
117. BEN J. WATTENBERG, THE BRH DEARTH (1987).
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nation's borders particularly to brown-skinned immigrants.'
Consider also the English-Only movement."9 Much of this atti-
tude is fueled by the conviction that "those people" are not fit to
reside here, that their language, customs, and morals are inferi-
or, and that they are and always will be second-class citizens.
All of these cultural strands converge around the idea that this
is a white country and that nonwhite persons, genes, ideas, lan-
guages, and culture are inferior to European ones, a principal
theme in Dred Scott.
Nor has the legal system been totally divorced from the return
of the Dred Scott mentality In the Rodney King case, a Los
Angeles-area jury acquitted police officers who were videotaped
beating a black motorist while he lay unresisting on the
ground. 2 ° Testimony by the police and later interviews with
the jurors showed that the motorist, King, was seen as the kind
of being who might resist, who might at any moment strike out
with tremendous force, and who, because he was caught speed-
ing, deserved whatever penalty the police chose to inflict.''
Supreme Court decisions also contain hints of Dred Scott and
its brusque dismissal of African American humanity In
McCleskey v. Kemp,'22 the Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to Georgia's infliction of the death penalty, which fell
disproportionately heavily on blacks, particularly ones whose
victims were white.'23 The Court rejected McClesky's claim, at
the same time reprimanding him and his lawyers for even hav-
ing brought it.' 24 Such claims, based on statistical disparities,
118. E.g., Neuman, supra note 108. On the history of U.S. nativism, see NATMSM,
DISCRIMINATION, AND IMAGES OF IMMIGRANTS (George Pozzetta ed., 1991).
119. For a discussion of this and similar language-purification efforts, see Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 76, at 1035; Juan Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Es-
say on American Language, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 269 (1992).
120. For a collection of essays on the Rodney King case and the L.A. disturbances
that followed, see Symposium, Los Angeles, April 29, 1992 and Beyond: the Law,
Issues and Perspectives, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (1993).
121. Id., see Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Notes From California: Rodney k King and the
Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 199 (1993).
122. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 319 ("McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bod-
ies.").
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might be raised in virtually any setting, the Court reasoned,
resulting in repetitive demands "based upon any arbitrary
variable."'25  Cases brought by poor women-Wyman v.
James" (the welfare-search case), Maher v. Roe,'27 and other
abortion-funding cases-show the same thinly veiled exasper-
ation on the part of the Court. These decisions stop barely short
of telling poor women that they do not know their places and
what is expected of them-to be as quiet, prudent,
nondemanding, and nonsexual as possible. The demand for pri-
vacy in the face of a welfare inspection, or for an abortion from a
state-funded clinic, appears outrageous. The women are chas-
tised for the effrontery of wanting to live life on their own
terms."
Many earlier eras, of course, witnessed similar patterns of
advance followed by retrenchment. During Reconstruction, Afri-
can Americans made great gains, but these were followed by an
era of lynching and Jim Crow laws.'29 Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation was followed by new resistance in the South.3 ' In Eu-
rope, the broadened vistas and relaxed worker-migration policies
of the early European Community years soon were followed by
xenophobia, a resurgence of Nazism, and tightened controls on
immigration.'' We believe the United States is in the middle
of such a retrenchment today Indeed, it is as though the arrow
of time has reversed. We see the nineteenth-century cases ap-
pearing in modern guise before our eyes-first the Plessy line of
cases, then the notorious Civil Rights Cases, and finally, in the
wings, Dred Scott v. Sandford.
125. Id. at 317.
126. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
127. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
128. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 77, at 1033.
129. BELL, supra note 52, at 39-46; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UN-
FINISHED REVOLUTION (1988).
130. E.g., Kiarman, supra note 2, at 12-13, 76.
131. E.g., European Parliament Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia,
Report on the Findings of the Inquiry (1991); Comnnssion of the European Commu-
nities, Legal Instruments to Combat Racism and Xenophobia (1992); Italians Exam-
tne Fascist History, DEN. POST, Apr. 9, 1994, at 21A.
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III. WHAT BROWN AND THE RECONSTRUCTIVE PARADOX MEAN
FOR AcTIsTs AND REFORMERS: SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS
Brown, like all law reform cases, confronted built-in resistanc-
es that deprived it of the efficacy its supporters hoped for it.
Social reform proceeds, if at all, in small increments; the pendu-
lum swing 1i as apt to be backward at any given time as for-
ward. Brown's relatively slight effect is part of a broader form of
social response-the reconstructive paradox-which holds that
the greater the evil, the greater the need for reform; the greater
the reform effort, the more unprincipled and unjust the effort
will seem, and the greater the resistance it will call up. Even
more than other avenues for reform, law is handicapped by its
inability to engage in dialogue with the group whose values and
practices need changing. Except in criminal law, where it can
put violators in jail, law has little ability to provide the constant
reinforcement necessary to change attitudes or behavior. Indeed,
law is always outnumbered; doctrines such as standing ensure
that any wide-ranging legal edict appears incomprehensible and
wrong, evoking the reaction: Surely the court didn't mean that.
If we are right, reformers should hesitate to place much faith
in the legal system as the primary instrument for their agen-
das.132 Law is relatively powerless to effect social revolutions
as both theory and history, including the case of Brown, demon-
strate. Everything must change at once, so that -a far greater
focus than the merely legal is necessary before reform begins to
be possible. Because the reconstructive paradox has greatest
force with respect to courts, reformers ought to reserve judicial
activism for the later stages of a revolution, using courts for the
final mopping up steps to secure a social advance that society
has already begun to accept.
Litigation is expensive and frustrating if resorted to at the
wrong time. We urge that reformers reconsider the appropriate
time to use it. If employed too early, as it arguably may have
132. Compare our conclusion with similar ones drawn by GIRARDEAU A. SPANN,
RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993) (observing that Supreme Court litigation is of lim-
ited use as an instrument of racial reform) and BELL, supra note 5, at 26-50; see
also MLK, supra note 16, at 5 (similar observation about romantic view of law and
law's efficacy).
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been with Brown, it leads to false celebration, then disillusion-
ment by persons who, like African Americans, have waited too
long to see their just demands met-then betrayed.
CONCLUSION
Society has constructed Brown v. Board of Education as a
great case. Yet, as we have seen, the opimon failed to generalize
and accordingly exercised little influence outside the area of
school desegregation. Even within that arena, it brought about
relatively few improvements in the lives of black schoolchildren,
most of whom today attend schools that are just as segregated
and in even greater disarray than the ones they attended in
Brown's time.
We believe the two observations are related, indeed dependent
on one another.. We saw Brown as a startling, extraordinary
decision-which it was-for the very reasons that brought about
its demise-namely, the way in which it challenged and depart-
ed from current culture and orthodoxy Every law-reform deci-
sion, we pointed out, takes place against a background of beliefs,
narratives, meanings, and social practices that constitute a kind
of social gravitational field. This field causes the exceptional
case to erode quickly, to be resisted, interpreted away, and in-
creasingly ignored. This dissipation has visited Brown v. Board
of Education. Although we afford it lip service and pay attention
to its nnging, aspirational message on celebratory occasions,
other narratives have turned out to have greater vitality These
more lasting narratives are those of the nineteenth century cas-
es, ones that celebrate white superiority, that depict blacks as
inferior, subhuman, demanding, and unjustified. As a culture,
and as a legal profession, we are rapidly returning to the regime
of Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine and the Civil
Rights Cases view of blacks as imposers and whiners because
they desire to live in American society on the same terms as
whites. Moreover, we find some frightening straws in the
wind-indications that ought to give pause to any defender of
freedom and minority rights. We have reviewed evidence that
society generally, and the legal system in particular, are begin-
ning to regress in one final, decisive quantum jump. American
society, without the spur of Cold War competition or the need for
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minority labor or soldiers, is in serious danger of quietly, im-
plicitly readopting a familiar standard from another era: Dred
Scott v. Sandford, in which blacks and other minorities of color
have no rights that white Americans are bound to respect.
